MVB, Notes on the Hull trial (order of argument), c24 January 1814

MVB, Notes on the Hull trial [order of argument], [c24 January 1814]

order of Opening

I. The probability of a war in the Spring of 1812

2d. The importance of Detroit, as well to repel invasion from the <alluded> enemy as to keep the Indian in awe

1200 3d. The Call on Ohio & detachment of f a force for its protection
April 8th. 1812— 4. The appointment of Genl Hull & the reasons which led to it.

25th. May—

about 1500 & <illegible> <illegible> offered

5. The Assemblage of the Ohio Volunteers at Dayton, organization into Corps & del'd placed under the Command of Genl. Hull march to Urbana
10th June 6th. Joined by the 4th Regimt at Urbana composing an aggregate force of about 2100
5th July 7th. Arrived at Detr Spring Wells on the
12 July 8. Crossing into Canadya & the proclamation.
  9th. The affair at Aux Canard, the early opposition of the army
August 8th. 10th. The recrossing of the river
16th. August  11th. The Surrender on the 16th. of Detroit &c & the Fears of it, disgracefull &c
  12th. The Consequences.

Whether there disasters were owing with

I. To the Inadequacy of the force detached or want of military supplies

2nd. To Unavoidable accident discomfiture which sometimes abandoned attends the last concerted operations in War or

3dly. To the Treachery Cowardice or mismanagement of the Commanding Genl.

It will by my duty to shew that it was exclusively owing to the Latter.

I. Treachery of the Genl.

3rd article of the Constitution I: State what treason is
1st East 79

2nd. Authority to shew what “<Taking> to the Enemies of the land is

cuts

1st. July I. Sending the Boats with Muster Rolls correspond &c. Knowing or &c.
  2d. The abandoning of Sandwich a post necessary to the <indenture> of Malden
  3d. Refusal to attack Malden.
  4. Neglect to make the necessary Information to attack Malden.
  5th. Omitting to refrain the fort, works, & Gun Carriages.
  6th. Omitting to repel the approach of the enemy at Spring Wells
  7th. The Surrender without necessity
 

8th. The Letter of the 17th. August.

Cowardice

IId. Unofficerlike conduct.

I. In neglecting discipline & <union>

2d. No order of Battle on the March

3d. Sending the papers by the Boat

4th. Neglect to make the necessary information at the fort & to attack Malden

5th. Useless Waste of time at Sandwich to conciliate &c

6th. Postponing & finally abandoning the attack on Malden

7th. Not seasonably appreciating the importance of keeping open the Communication with the river raisin & <illegible> <illegible>

4th August 8th. Sending Van Horne with Inadequate force
8th August 9th. Miller with 500 men without provision & <walling> him after opened
14th Do. 10th. Sending Cass & Mc Arthur without suffic provisions

The Consequences of these reasons

11th. Omitting to retain the Bridge over the Aux Canard &c.

12th. Refusing to annoy the Enemy on landing

13th. Neglecting to fortify at Spring Wells

14. o

IIId. Cowardice

I. Having a superiority in point of force & adequately provided with the munition of War

2d. Omitting to meet the Enemy on the Beach or fighting them in the plain

3d. By omission to reconnoitre

4th. By refusing permission to Capt. Dalliby to dislodge the enemy while meeting their fortification, & his Declaration to Capt Dalliby

5. By avoidng all personal danger & securing himself in the fort, ordering the Centre Battalion to cease firing.

6th. By various cowardly actions and expressions, such as to Col. Findly

7th. By hastily hoisting & sending flags of Truce.

8th. By Calling the Troops from the field without fightg & storing them in the fort

9th. By a precipitate declaration that he surrendered before Capitulation signed

10th. By consenting to capitulation, the most disgracefull w to be found in the annals of Warfare & which ought never to have been assented to while the remotest possibility of success existed, & to which he could alone have been induced by personal fear.

Disgracefull <terms>

2111 besides the Michigan Militia in the whole about 3000 I. he had a superior numerical force
  2d. Superior in Conduct &c.
90 Barrels besides fixed ammunition  3d. a Sufficiency of powder to endure any conflict which the State of the power could have produced
250 Barrels Flour meat <w> abandon & green &c. 4th. Provisions for at least 15 days & more with in the said town
  5. A Train of artillery & ordinance of the <best> order & quantity.
 

6th. The force of the enemy army way inferior viz

less than [. . .]0 Regulars

less than 600 Militia

less than 300 Indians

 

7th. Under these circumstances the Capitulation was made

without, Stipulating for the honor of War

without Do. for <him> to inform the Gov

without, Stipulating for indemnity for the Canadians.

                        

Docket:

United States

v

 Genl. Hull

Editorial Process Complete