MVB, Notes on the Hull trial (order of argument), c24 January 1814
MVB, Notes on the Hull trial [order of argument], [c24 January 1814]
order of Opening
I. The probability of a war in the Spring of 1812
2d. The importance of Detroit, as well to repel invasion from the <alluded> enemy as to keep the Indian in awe
|1200||3d. The Call on Ohio & detachment of
|April 8th. 1812—||4. The appointment of Genl Hull & the reasons which led to it.|
about 1500 & <illegible> <illegible> offered
|5. The Assemblage of the Ohio Volunteers at Dayton, organization into Corps &
|10th June||6th. Joined by the 4th Regimt at Urbana composing an aggregate force of about 2100|
|5th July||7th. Arrived at
|12 July||8. Crossing into Canad
|9th. The affair at Aux Canard, the early opposition of the army|
|August 8th.||10th. The recrossing of the river|
|16th. August||11th. The Surrender
|12th. The Consequences.|
Whether there disasters were owing with
I. To the Inadequacy of the force detached or want of military supplies
2nd. To Unavoidable
accident discomfiture which sometimes abandoned attends the last concerted operations in War or
3dly. To the Treachery Cowardice or mismanagement of the Commanding Genl.
It will by my duty to shew that it was exclusively owing to the Latter.
I. Treachery of the Genl.
|3rd article of the Constitution||I: State what treason is|
|1st East 79||
2nd. Authority to shew what “<Taking> to the Enemies of the land is
|1st. July||I. Sending the Boats with Muster Rolls correspond &c. Knowing or &c.|
|2d. The abandoning of Sandwich a post necessary to the <indenture> of Malden|
|3d. Refusal to attack Malden.|
|4. Neglect to make the necessary Information to attack Malden.|
|5th. Omitting to refrain the fort, works, & Gun Carriages.|
|6th. Omitting to repel the approach of the enemy at Spring Wells|
|7th. The Surrender without necessity|
8th. The Letter of the 17th. August.
IId. Unofficerlike conduct.
I. In neglecting discipline & <union>
2d. No order of Battle on the March
3d. Sending the papers by the Boat
4th. Neglect to make the necessary information at the fort & to attack Malden
5th. Useless Waste of time at Sandwich to conciliate &c
6th. Postponing & finally abandoning the attack on Malden
7th. Not seasonably appreciating the importance of keeping open the Communication with the river raisin & <illegible> <illegible>
|4th August||8th. Sending Van Horne with Inadequate force|
|8th August||9th. Miller with 500 men without provision & <walling> him after opened|
|14th Do.||10th. Sending Cass & Mc Arthur without suffic provisions|
The Consequences of these reasons
11th. Omitting to retain the Bridge over the Aux Canard &c.
12th. Refusing to annoy the Enemy on landing
13th. Neglecting to fortify at Spring Wells
I. Having a superiority in point of force & adequately provided with the munition of War
2d. Omitting to meet the Enemy on the Beach or fighting them in the plain
3d. By omission to reconnoitre
4th. By refusing permission to Capt. Dalliby to dislodge the enemy while meeting their fortification, & his Declaration to Capt Dalliby
5. By avoidng all personal danger & securing himself in the fort, ordering the Centre Battalion to cease firing.
6th. By various cowardly actions and expressions, such as to Col. Findly
7th. By hastily hoisting & sending flags of Truce.
8th. By Calling the Troops from the field without fightg & storing them in the fort
9th. By a precipitate declaration that he surrendered before Capitulation signed
10th. By consenting to capitulation, the most disgracefull
w to be found in the annals of Warfare & which ought never to have been assented to while the remotest possibility of success existed, & to which he could alone have been induced by personal fear.
|2111 besides the Michigan Militia in the whole about 3000||I. he had a superior numerical force|
|2d. Superior in Conduct &c.|
|90 Barrels besides fixed ammunition||3d. a Sufficiency of powder to endure any conflict which the State of the power could have produced|
|250 Barrels Flour meat <w> abandon & green &c.||4th. Provisions for at least 15 days & more with in the
|5. A Train of artillery & ordinance of the <best> order & quantity.|
6th. The force of the enemy army way inferior viz
less than [. . .]0 Regulars
less than 600 Militia
less than 300 Indians
7th. Under these circumstances the Capitulation was made
without, Stipulating for the honor of War
without Do. for <him> to inform the Gov
without, Stipulating for indemnity for the Canadians.